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CAN WE COMPARE EVILS? 
THE ENDURING DEBATE ON GENOCIDE AND 
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 
STEVEN R. RATNER∗ 
A look back at the twentieth century reveals that the most critical steps 
in the criminalization of mass human rights constituted the academic work 
of Raphel Lemkin and his conceptualization of genocide; the International 
Military Tribunal Charter’s criminalization of crimes against humanity 
and the trials that followed; and the conclusion and broad ratification of 
the Genocide Convention. The Convention was the first treaty since those 
of slavery and the “white slave traffic” to criminalize peacetime actions by 
a government against its citizens. Since that time, customary international 
law has recognized the de-coupling of crimes against humanity from 
wartime. 
The result of this process has been two separate international criminal 
proscriptions—one through custom, one through treaty—covering slightly 
different sets of atrocities against civilians. The three key differences 
between genocide under the Genocide Convention and crimes against 
humanity (under multiple definitions, including that of the Statute creating 
the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute)) are the inclusion in the 
former only of three elements: (a) the intent to destroy a group in whole or 
in part; (b) a limited set of groups against whose members the relevant acts 
are criminal, i.e., racial, religious, national, or ethnic; and (c) a limited list 
of grave underlying acts focusing on physical extermination.1 
Why should we care if international law recognizes two different 
crimes? Domestic law frequently criminalizes different acts as different 
crimes—if the difference between libel and battery makes perfect sense to 
us, or that between homicide and manslaughter, why not just see this as 
part of same issue?  
The short answer is that reality will not let us—that governments, 
NGOs, and the public see genocide and crimes against humanity not 
simply as distinct crimes, but that the former is worse than the latter—and, 
moreover, that a determination that a state or group has committed the 
 
 
 ∗ Professor of Law, University of Michigan.  
 1. Compare Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crimes of Genocide, Dec. 9, 
1948, art. 2, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, with Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.183/9. 
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former should trigger more serious consequences against the violator than 
should the latter.  
Inversely, governments, both those committing atrocities and those 
responding to them, refuse to use the term genocide because they fear that 
their publics will demand some kind of action to stop it. These divergent 
outcomes represent a challenge for international human rights insofar as 
the protection of human rights demands responses to both and prosecution 
of both. 
LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACHES TO THE TWO CRIMES 
Lawyers and philosophers have offered a number of different 
diagnoses and prescriptions about the relative gravity of the two crimes.  
1. Genocide and crimes against humanity are equally bad. This 
position represents the mainstream answer from human rights scholars and 
practitioners. They would note that these definitions are a product of 
historical accident and do not mean that one crime is worse than the other. 
They would also point out that, as a matter of law, neither genocide nor 
crimes against humanity create a duty on states to intervene in the affected 
state. Their solution is to explain to people that both crimes are horrible—
in different ways, but ultimately equally horrible. We witness this view in 
the report Commission of Experts for Darfur, which found genocide 
absent but emphasized the gravity of its finding of crimes against 
humanity.2 
2. Genocide is worse. This position argues that, although the definition 
in the Convention may be the product of a negotiated compromise, the 
Convention succeeded in criminalizing a particularly evil crime against 
humanity, one with special intent directed at destruction of groups based 
on immutable traits.3 It thus justifies the appellation of the crime of 
crimes. Larry May has brought in a similar idea in his notion that even 
crimes against humanity must include an element of discrimination in 
order to be international crimes.4 Their solution is to apply scrupulously 
the definition of genocide when appraising atrocities; the result of this 
process will be that the term will be reserved for a small set of atrocities. 
 
 
 2. See Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations 
Secretary-General, Jan. 25, 2005, ¶ 506, http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf. 
 3. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF CRIMES (2000); 
Alison Martson Danner, Constructing a Hierarchy of Crimes in International Law Sentencing, 87 VA. 
L. REV. 415 (2001). It has also been reflected in a number of ICTR opinions. 
 4. LARRY MAY, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: A NORMATIVE ACCOUNT 80–90 (2005). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol6/iss3/10
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3. Genocide is worse, Version II. This position would agree that the 
destruction of the groups is somehow worse, but insists that these groups 
include (a) any permanent or stable group, or (b) any of the four groups 
mentioned in the Convention as perceived as such in the eyes of the 
perpetrator. The former part of this version was adopted by the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in Akayesu, and the 
latter by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) in Jelisic.5 Their solution thus entails including as genocide many 
murders that others would regard as crimes against humanity through 
creative interpretation of the Convention.  
4. Genocide should be worse but is not. This position, adopted by 
David Luban, argues that genocide has come to mean very little different 
from crimes against humanity because the definition in the Convention 
includes not merely the attempt to destroy a whole group, but also the 
attempt to destroy any part of it on a territory; and because the ICTR and 
ICTY have watered down genocide through Akayesu and Jelisic 
interpretations noted above.6 His solution is to broaden the definition of 
genocide to include the crime against humanity of extermination. Through 
this treaty amendment, the legal meaning of genocide will conform to our 
contemporary understandings of the term. 
5. All evil acts against civilians are genocide. Under this view, 
genocide means many acts beyond physical extermination, such as 
destruction of culture and environmental degradation. I will not discuss 
this position further because the view moves genocide too far about its 
core, which is -cide, for the Latin caedere, “to cut (down), strike, beat . . . 
to kill,”7  
APPRAISING THE FOUR RESPONSES  
1. Genocide and crimes against humanity are equally bad. This 
approach reflects a strong cosmopolitan view of equal dignity of persons 
and no special worth to groups. Thus, a campaign against any civilian 
population is just as bad as one with the intent to destroy one of those 
protected groups. The practical problem with this view, however, is that it 
faces a constant uphill battle against the public’s notion of genocide—
 
 
 5. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶¶ 510–16 (Sept. 2, 1998); Prosecutor v. 
Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-T, ¶¶ 69–72 (Dec. 14, 1999). 
 6. David Luban, Calling Genocide by Its Rightful Name: Lemkin’s Word, Darfur, and the UN 
Report, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 303 (2006). 
 7. CASSELL’S NEW LATIN DICTIONARY 83 (1960). 
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although this objection will mean little to those cosmopolitan philosophers 
who believe public (mis)perceptions should not influence moral reasoning. 
This position is also morally troublesome to communitarians and others 
who believe in special moral value of associations of individuals. This 
school of thought would include those philosophers who have sought to 
justify why a citizen of a state owes special duties to fellow nationals. 
Indeed, it could include those who find group associations morally 
relevant on their own as well as those who find that moral value of groups 
is derivative, e.g., on utilitarian or contractarian grounds.8 Those who 
endorse hate crimes legislation would have similar difficulty with this 
position.  
In examining this position, I find an appeal in Larry May’s point that 
there is something particularly evil and disruptive to world public order 
about an act with discriminatory intent against people who have no control 
over part of their identity, even as I accept that what those immutable 
aspects are is subject to great disagreement. The mainstream human rights 
view represented in the first approach simply lacks a good response to that 
observation. 
2. Genocide is worse. The second view responds to the concerns of the 
communitarians above by endorsing the Convention definition. While 
admitting that it is not a perfect definition, they insist that it gets to the 
core of something fundamentally worse. This approach will surely be of 
great difficulty for those cosmopolitans who place no value on group 
identity—who see no moral difference between any large-scale killing and 
one with a particular discriminatory intent. This victim-centered 
perspective simply cannot accept a difference between the two crimes. 
Indeed, I wonder whether even communitarians who place a moral value 
on groups per se or those who accept derivative importance of group 
identity must conclude that killing with intent to destroy those groups is 
worse than other killing.  
It is worth noting that positivist international lawyers will not have 
much to say about this dispute. They will say that the two crimes simply 
go at different things and that the important thing is to interpret the two 
norms (treaty, custom) according to acceptable processes of interpretation. 
3. Genocide is worse, Version II. This position attempts to square the 
circle somewhat by accepting one critique of the existing Convention 
definition—the irrationality of the list of protected groups—and seeing 
 
 
 8. See generally Steven R. Ratner, Is International Law Impartial?, 11 LEGAL THEORY 39 
(2005). 
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immutability as broader than those groups or that group status is in eyes of 
the evildoer. This position makes sense if one thinks that discriminatory 
intent makes a crime particularly evil and that such intent should include 
discrimination against any group based on immutable features or that 
intent should be separate from the objective features of the group. 
On the other hand, this position could also be seen as a half-way house 
that will satisfy neither the cosmopolitans nor the communitarians. The 
cosmopolitans will criticize it for giving special moral status to something 
irrelevant—i.e., group status—and that extending such status to social, 
political, gender, or other groups is fundamentally to overlook the equal 
dignity of the individual. The communitarians or others who accept the 
idea of moral worth of groups will claim that immutability is not a morally 
relevant concern for creating and giving special protection to a 
community; and, moreover, that such worth is inherent in the community 
and not a function of how it is viewed by the perpetrator. International 
lawyers, for their part, will object that this approach is an improper 
interpretation of the Genocide Convention as a methodological matter. 
4. Genocide should be worse, but is not. This approach also attempts to 
square the circle, but not by accepting the critiques of the Convention’s 
definition of genocide. Rather, it says that there is nothing morally special, 
in light of what the Tribunals are doing, about genocide any more 
compared to crimes against humanity of extermination (which does not 
care about special intent). This view will satisfy cosmopolitans, because 
now genocide includes a category of victims where group affiliation does 
not matter; but it is a defeat for the communitarians, as those acts with the 
intent to destroy a group are no longer considered worse. International 
lawyers will not have problem in that it talks about amending a treaty, 
except that they would like regard it as so wildly impractical that they will 
say that only a philosopher could have come up with it. 
TOWARD A POSSIBLE SOLUTION 
For me, the most relevant question relating the genocide/crimes against 
humanity controversy is the following: Is the public right in making a 
distinction between gravity of the two crimes, and how does one’s answer 
to this question suggest what needs to be done? 
My general view about nation-states is that their moral status flows 
from their ability to allow individuals to exercise their dignity and 
autonomy more than to exercise some group status. I thus basically find 
Robert Goodin’s justification for any special duties to countrymen the 
most satisfying—that states are sensible units that allow individual human 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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dignity to flow.9 This, I suppose, makes me a sort of realistic cosmopolitan 
because I can accept the utility of states while feeling that we owe as much 
concern for the starving person overseas as to the one at home. 
I find some need to accept the public’s distinction, for it has two 
powerful pulls. First, Larry May has a key insight in his view about the 
evil of discriminatory intent against individuals based on uncontrollable 
character traits. Second, the public’s view meshes with the pull of 
history—the pull of the Holocaust. The public invocation of the term 
genocide represents an attempt to make a connection with that unique 
catastrophe for human dignity and a statement that that is the point at 
which intervention is morally imperative. 
Yet to accept that view is to say that the Khmer Rouge period, or 
China’s purges, or North Korea’s, are, however outrageous, not worthy of 
intervention. This position probably still represents the attitude of states 
today, which is why so many of them want to avoid being accused of 
genocide, but it demeans the victims of those atrocities. Accepting the 
unique aspects of the Holocaust or the Rwandan genocide (which, while 
less scientific and less far ranging, was more rapid), does not mean that we 
have to make all genocides worse than all exterminations without that 
special intent. 
The lawyers’ solution, that used by the Darfur groups of experts, solves 
this problem by insisting on moral equivalence of the crimes while all 
along insisting on their legal distinction. But I wonder whether this can 
this really work. Can the public understand the notion of “separate but 
equal” crimes? Just as this did not work for civil rights, I fear it cannot 
work for international criminal law.  
In the end, I fall back on a proposal different from any of the four 
discussed above—one that encourages states to adopt domestic definitions 
of genocide that do what David Luban wants to do to by treaty; and to 
encourage the development of customary international law that adopts a 
definition of genocide broader than the existing notion.10 Under this 
approach, the treaty definition of genocide can be left alone as a reminder 
of what states after World War II were grappling with—the legacy of the 
Holocaust. Indeed, the way international law works, we are as a practical 
matter stuck with it in the Convention and the ICC Statute. But we also 
need to have an alternative vision of genocide under customary 
 
 
 9. Robert E. Goodin, What is So Special about Our Fellow Countrymen?, 98 ETHICS 663 
(1988). 
 10. STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 43–45 (2d ed. 2001). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol6/iss3/10
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international law, running parallel to Convention, that adopts the 
cosmopolitan version. That alternative vision does not ignore the special 
evil of the Holocaust; rather, it is based on the need to understand the 
enormity of, the factors behind, and the full range of practices used by 
governments and non-state actors to kill off political or class enemies with 
such dispatch. Like all but the second alternative above, adoption of this 
position is also an uphill battle, but one can begin to imagine the 
vocabulary associated with the idea—something like “modern 
genocide”—or “contemporary genocide.” 
Despite my appeal to history, this solution will, for some, break a 
critical historical and emotional link with the Holocaust or Rwanda. But if 
the benefit is greater public interest in preventing, stopping, and punishing 
mass killings without the special intent or the special groups of the 
Genocide Convention, it will clearly be worth it, whatever one’s moral 
outlook. 
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